DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 257 717 SO 016 492

TITLE	Managing East-West Conflict: A Framework for Sustained Engagement. Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group.
INSTITUTION	Aspen Inst. for Humanistic Studies, New York, N.Y.
REPORT NO	ISBN-0-89843-063-1
PUB DATE	84
NOTE	40p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Publications Office, P.O. Box 150, Queenstown, MD 21658 ($5.00).
PUB TYPE	Viewpoints (120)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Communism; *Conflict Resolution; Cultural Exchange; *Democracy; Disarmament; Economics; Educational Needs; Foreign Policy; Futures (of Society); *Global Approach; International Cooperation; International Educational Exchange; *International Relations; International Trade; National Security; Nuclear Warfare; Political Influences; Political Issues; *World Affairs; World Problems
IDENTIFIERS	Cold War; *East West Conflict; United States; USSR

ABSTRACT

A framework containing general principles to help industrial democracies deal with the Soviet Union and its allies over the years and decades to come is presented. The direction advocated by the framework is one involving active, sustained, and positive engagement with the East. There are five major parts to the framework. Part I discusses the East-West relationship by examining Western and Soviet premises and priorities. Part II deals with the political relationship between East and West, and contends that the process of steadily increasing contacts and constructive interactions with the East must rest on the twin pillars of firmness and flexibility. Part III deals with the security relationship. Ways to reduce risks, maintain security, curb the arms race, and open a new channel of communication are discussed. International trade is the focus of Part IV which emphasizes that economic relations must be widened. The framework concludes with a discussion of how to cooperate by developing cultural and educational ties between the East and West, encouraging program exchanges, and using radio and television to present more positive images and attitudes for the youth of both countries. (RM)

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Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

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Managing East-West Conflict

A Framework for Sustained Engagement

Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group

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

CE 016 192

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Managing East-West Conflict

A Framework for Sustained Engagement

Statement of the Aspen Institute International Group

Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies
New York 1984

I.S.B.N. 0-89843-063-1

Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies
717 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10022

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in 1984 by the Aspen Institute for
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Printed in the United States of America

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PREFACE

Early in 1983 the Aspen Institute initiated this project on East-West Relations. An international group of experienced leaders from Europe, Japan, and North America, many of them trustees and close friends of the Institute, yet widely diverse in their political, professional and national backgrounds, responded enthusiastically to the challenge to think together in a non-partisan spirit about the conceptual and institutional changes required for the middle and long term, even when these are not negotiable at present.

The distinguished members of the Aspen Institute International Group agreed to join in a search for underlying concepts which could serve to hold our industrial democracies on a steady course in dealing with the Soviet Union and its allies over the years and even decades to come. The project was not designed to substitute the judgments of the Group for those of governments, but rather to complement their work by addressing some of the larger questions in a way which leaders in office often find difficult to manage. The Group, however, found a large measure of agreement within itself on a number of current topics and felt it useful to offer its suggestions, often as illustrations of the general guidelines it advocates.

The process out of which this Statement evolved covered almost two years. The Group met in four plenary sessions, two in the United States and two in Europe. Papers on major questions were commissioned from leading scholars, prepared by the staff, and contributed by Group members themselves.

In addition to these plenary meetings, a number of smaller meetings on particular subjects were convened. These took place in London, Tokyo, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Rome and Ottawa as well as in the United States. The participants included both members of the Aspen International Group and a wide range of officials, business leaders, scholars, and others who generously contributed on all aspects of our topic. A number of leading figures, many of them from developing countries, were interviewed or contributed papers. These interviews, papers, minutes of discussions, and other documents are being compiled into a record of the project. It will be available both to students of this current moment and to future historians as a cross-section of what leading world figures judge to be the salient features of the gravest problems the world faces today.

The Statement which has emerged from this process is a group document. Not every signer agrees fully with every point in the text, but all affirm that it reflects the consensus among our participants. Each subscribes to the overall philosophy and content of the Statement and to its principal recommendations.

In its original conception, and we believe in its execution, this project has balanced two opposed, but not irreconcilable, attitudes. One is the concern which serious citizens must feel over the dangers inherent in a confrontation between two great military alliances, each armed with nuclear weapons. The other is the optimism which students of world history must feel as they contemplate the perils humanity has overcome in the past and the achievements it has registered. The Group has examined the nuclear danger, indeed the dangers and costs of any war between East and West, and it has proposed measures to lessen the risk. It is deeply conscious of the need to defend our Western political and cultural values, and of the very different attitudes and values espoused in the East. The harsh Soviet position on the vital question of human rights and their different approach to basic standards of justice present especially grave difficulties. The Group is, however, satisfied that in the fullness of time history will deliver its clear judgment in favor of freedom and democracy.

The course advocated by the Group, a course involving active, sustained and positive engagement with the East, does not offer the deceptive simplicity of "win" or "lose." Solutions will surely not be easy or quick and even viable approaches may be difficult to define. But the Group has every confidence that progress can be made. We can make ourselves more secure, not by making our adversaries less secure, but by working with them to develop lines of action which over time enhance the security of both sides. We can make ourselves safer and more prosperous, not by undermining the economies of our adversaries, but through the prospect of cooperation for our common benefit, and the benefit of the planet we all share. As John J. McCloy, one of our wisest and most experienced members, has said, the West needs "a philosophy of interdependence" which will "challenge the Soviet Union to positive action."

I hope that the decision makers "on the other side", in Moscow and the capitals of Eastern Europe, will be willing to give to the difficult questions that divide us the same careful attention and receptivity to new approaches which we believe has guided

our Group. Such a spirit is ever more widespread in the West, and if it develops in the East as well, I am confident that the leaders there will find they are being met more than halfway.

The Aspen Institute is pleased and proud, not only that such a distinguished array of leaders has been willing to address this vital problem within the framework of our institution, but also that the Group's proceedings and conclusions have illustrated so clearly the central, humanistic character of our "Aspen idea" and "Aspen approach." The Group has effectively integrated the broadest and most diverse considerations — political, cultural, economic, military, social, technological — into a consistent outlook and program.

It is my conviction that this major effort by our Institute will help to set the stage for a broad and deep public debate, both on the conclusions our Group has put forward and on the many important questions which time and other limitations have constrained us from developing. As this debate goes forward, the Institute and its network of trustees, fellows, alumni and friends look forward to contributing in any way we can.

I want to express my appreciation and that of my colleagues to the project director, James Leonard, whose broad experience, intelligence, and warm and effective manner were essential to our success. He and the project coordinator, Martin McCusker, as well as other staff members, worked tirelessly to ensure that all points of view would be represented and that the process itself would be productive. Herbert Okun's profound knowledge of East-West relations and his wise counsel were invaluable assets. There were, moreover, important contributions from all elements of the Aspen Institute, including particularly the leaders and staff in Berlin, in Rome, and at the Wye Plantation.

Finally, I want to thank most warmly the foundations and individuals whose financial support made possible this study. They are:

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The General Services Foundation
The George Gund Foundation
The Schumann Foundation
The Ford Foundation
John M. Musser
Audrey Mars
Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
Marc and Sandra Porat
John and Evelyn Nef

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Managing East-West Conflict
A Framework for Sustained Engagement

Foreword

In the four decades since the end of the Second World War, no nuclear weapon has been exploded in anger. Most people under colonial rule have found their way to independence. Living standards worldwide have improved. The industrial democracies, people and leaders alike, have much to be proud of and thankful for.

Yet unease hangs in the air. Ordinary men and women, and particularly the young, are often skeptical about the capacity of governments to ensure a better tomorrow. This doubt does not stem from a fundamental loss of faith but rather from the uncertainties caused by rapid change, by widespread unemployment and other difficulties in our economies, by the seemingly unending arms race, the tragic conflicts in so many parts of the world, and the shortcomings of the international system. Yet these do not fully explain the pervasive loss of Jean Monnet's "reasoned optimism," of confidence in the future.

The Aspen Institute International Group believes that a justified fear of crises which could lead to nuclear war lies near the center of this unease. There is widespread concern that East-West tension could deteriorate into unmanageable confrontation. Governments on both sides must deal with this problem, for it is real and it is urgent. This will be no easy task. We recognize that it is doubly difficult for the West when such action depends heavily on working with a nuclear-armed adversary who proclaims unyielding hostility to our political and economic system and our vision of mankind's future. Yet the task must be undertaken.

Why must the West act? Why should not each side go its own way, keeping their dealings to the unavoidable minimum? The answer is clear. The problems dividing East and West are too serious, too fraught with peril for both sides for us to permit them to fester in the hope that they will somehow solve themselves. They will not. Only the consistent application of will and courage — and vision — can enable the leaders of East and West to provide for their people what is often promised but rarely delivered: peace, security, stability — the essential conditions for material progress and spiritual renewal.

I. The Relationship in Perspective

All thoughtful people are concerned over the state of East-West relations. Hostility runs high; contacts are sparse; rhetoric has clouded reality; and there are risks of dangerous misunderstandings. The fear of a military confrontation leading to nuclear war looms large in the popular mind. With ever more sophisticated and expensive weapons, present tensions also entail immense economic cost to both East and West, and the danger of serious damage to the world economic system.

Western governments are aware that they have a duty and an opportunity to take corrective action. There have been positive initiatives but as yet no encouraging results. Mistrust is deep and cannot be overcome with brave words. The West needs a coherent, widely-supported policy, rooted in reality and pressed with conviction and determination — a policy that protects its vital interests, enhances its political cohesion, and also offers hope of influencing Soviet policy in a favorable direction.

Let us speak plainly. We do not expect the grand antagonism between East and West to end. The Soviet Union is both a country and a cause, and there are fundamental points of difference between us. Soviet conduct, as exemplified by Afghanistan and Poland, requires the West to remain watchful and strong. We do not expect, nor do we espouse, convergence between our systems. The Soviet system is not only at odds with our ideas of justice and liberty, it is based on the proposition that our system must and will disappear. Yet we cannot permit ourselves the mirror image of that illusion. The USSR will not disappear. It has had some striking successes and some notable failures, but it is not disintegrating. It is changing, but change is not likely to be rapid, and we must assume it will continue seeking to extend its influence, at least when it believes it can safely do so.

This summary catalogue of obstacles, significant as they are, is not cause for despair. There are countervailing forces at work. The existence of huge nuclear arsenals in both East and West imposes caution: if we cannot live together we will die together. Apocalyptic rhetoric notwithstanding, East and West are not locked in a duel to the death. Their adversarial relationship need not become a replay of Rome vs. Carthage. Compromises are not only possible, in the final sense they are the only possibility and

both sides know it. If we view the relationship with sober objectivity, there is reason for cautious hope.

What are Western premises and priorities with regard to the East?

- To preserve our democratic freedoms while continuing to deter conventional and nuclear war;
- To reduce the danger and burden of armaments in a balanced, verifiable manner, avoiding situations which could invite attack;
- To negotiate political understandings which avoid crises, encourage restraint, reduce tensions, and stabilize relations;
- To demilitarize the continuing adversarial competition in the Third World;
- To encourage evolutionary change — political, economic, social, cultural — which can reduce basic East-West differences;
- To promote trade and cultural, educational and scientific exchanges for their own sake and for the contributions they can make to a fruitful dialogue;
- To gain Eastern cooperation in dealing with global problems: economic development, nuclear proliferation, environment, and health.

These objectives are best served, in our view, through sustained engagement — a marked increase in all areas of constructive contact with the East. This engagement should be actively pursued across the entire range of relations. The separate military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should move from a condition of mutual insecurity toward mutual security. The economies of the USSR and its allies should be drawn more deeply into fruitful relations with the Western industrial nations and into the world economy as a whole. The movement of persons and of information, as well as cultural and scientific contacts, should rise far above present levels. Most important, political relations between East and West will have to be substantially improved and intensified if the other changes are to be effected and sustained.

And what are Soviet premises and priorities? In our judgment, they see their objectives as follows:

- To preserve the Soviet state and the leading role of the Communist Party while maintaining military strength as the essential guardian of Soviet power;

- To maintain a dominant position within the Communist camp, particularly in Eastern Europe, while seeking to divide the US from its allies;
- To avoid nuclear and conventional war with the West;
- To extend Soviet influence, ideology and, where possible, Soviet power while gaining acceptance as an equal of the US in dealing with global political problems;
- To better relations with China on Soviet terms and discourage Chinese military relations with the West;
- To negotiate reductions in nuclear forces on advantageous terms, maintaining nuclear parity with the US and reducing US technological advantages;
- To strengthen the Soviet economy through controlled trade with the industrial democracies.

Given these priorities, will the Soviet Union be willing to engage seriously with the West? Can it become involved in constructive relationships without altering the foundations of its system? Might the leadership not misinterpret Western willingness to engage them as a sign of weakness? Several points should be noted. Over the seven decades of its existence, the USSR has moved from economic and political autarky to a form of limited engagement with the West. While it has sought to control the conditions under which it pursues its own version of engagement, its posture in general tends to favor an expansion of contacts. Technological advances, particularly in communications, are likely to give impetus to this movement.

The political systems of East and West do not espouse common values, but the two alliance systems share some common interests. Understandings with the USSR and its allies will not come easily, but history teaches that even enduring enmities between states or groups of states can take second place to specific interests. Understandings between East and West should not be mistaken for definitive settlements. But they can be balanced, each within itself, according neither side unilateral advantage, offering both sides mutual advantages.

We cannot stress enough that this process will require time, patience, and consistency of purpose. Moreover, there are limits to the process; this is not an engagement that can lead to a marriage. The process cannot work unless it becomes reciprocal, but it is not to be expected that each step the West takes will be immediately matched by the East. The West should not seek

agreements for agreements' sake, but it should not fear that a positive stance will look weak. The Western posture should be active and open — willing to develop the relationship along sound and mutually beneficial lines.

Whether the Soviet Union will grasp new opportunities to improve its relations with the West is up to the Soviet leaders. They will face difficult decisions as a new generation moves into commanding positions. Their people and the people of Eastern Europe, like our own, would welcome a change for the better. What the West can do — and it must do no less — is to engage persistently and consistently in the search for constructive approaches to the many problems besetting East-West relations. The choice will remain with the East, and primarily with the USSR. As for the West, it should compete where it must but cooperate where it can.

II. The Political Relationship

A. *Sustained Engagement.* The process of steadily increasing our contacts and constructive interactions with the East must rest on twin pillars: firmness and flexibility. This approach, set forth more than a decade ago in the Harmel Report on defense and detente in Europe, retains its validity today. Both pillars are essential if Western policy is to have broad support and the possibility of success. There is no contradiction here. Detente without defense would amount to surrender on the installment plan. Defense without detente, without the persistent search for peaceful resolution of differences, would increase tensions and the risk of conflict. Taken together, the pillars reinforce each other.

Sustaining a policy of contact has practical implications. Influential figures from East and West already meet in a variety of situations; but the frequency and content of these encounters should be enhanced, gaps should be filled and, most important, these contacts need to be infused with a determination to manage constructively the problems which divide us. This spirit and tone must be set at the very top, and public support must be enlisted. Summit and sub-summit meetings, bilateral and multilateral, should be multiplied, not deferred because important agreements are not likely to emerge. Summit meetings are especially important. If they are more frequent, unrealistic expectations will thereby be deflated. It would also be sensible to regularize multilateral summits, perhaps as periodic meetings of the Atlantic

Alliance and Warsaw Pact countries, or of signatories to the Helsinki accords, or in the UN Security Council.

The West should press for increased high-level contacts of all types, official and unofficial, with a particular effort to establish periodic exchanges with members of the Soviet and East European Politburos, Central Committees, and their secretariats. There ought to be open invitations for Soviet and East European participation in international organizations of which they are not members. In Europe, the Helsinki process must be pursued in all its dimensions, especially human rights. Such Western institutions as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Community should consider how they might contribute to bridging the East-West divide. The potential of the Economic Commission for Europe should be reexamined in a positive spirit.

Sustained and constructive engagement also requires careful modulation of the tone of East-West relations. We believe civility by leaders of both sides is almost always the wiser course. To be sure, a temperate tone cannot by itself lead to good relations, but intemperate language on both sides can and often does worsen them. It can complicate the task of Western political leaders who sometimes find their options narrowed by the sentiments to which they have given voice. And if Soviet spokesmen continue to vilify our system? We would still counsel firm but restrained responses, focused on the substance of the issues. They are complex and deep-seated enough. But where talks and peaceful communications do not suffice to resolve serious issues, those who would make themselves our adversaries must also know that the West will defend its vital interests by all means, including the use of force if necessary.

The focus of East-West relations and the area of greatest danger has long been Europe. Yet the Soviet Union is a Eurasian power and its relations in Asia and the Pacific region have become equally important, making some East-West problems global rather than regional. This is underlined by the tendency for regional problems in the developing world to acquire an East-West dimension, leading to superpower confrontations.

The "West" is present in the "East" in the form of a series of allies and friends in the Pacific-Asian region, notably Japan, but including Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, members of the Association of Southeat Asian Nations (ASEAN), and

others. These nations increasingly share the entrepreneurial values associated with Europe and North America, while guarding their own national characters. They constitute the basic framework for security and stability in the region, and they too feel threatened, either directly by the USSR, as in the case of Japan and Korea, or by the expansionism of a Soviet ally, as in Southeast Asia.

The recent evolution of events in China has great potential significance. If China succeeds in setting itself firmly on the road of economic development with openness to outside contacts and influences, it can become a powerful factor for stability in Asia. At the same time we can understand Soviet concern over the power concentrated in such an enormous neighbor, and one with historical grievances and differences. It should be no part of the West's policy to play on Sino-Soviet differences, or to allow itself to be enlisted by either against the other. Rather the West should favor a normalization of relations between these two major actors on the world stage, a process which may well take years or decades.

B. *Europe: Two Vital Processes.* The division of Europe has lasted for forty years: unnatural, but not unstable. Behind the NATO shield the nations of Western Europe have prospered enormously. The great post-war yearning for West European integration has moved forward in fits and starts, giving birth to the European Community and other West European institutions. Recently the Community has seemed to be losing its sense of larger purpose. Statesmanship and common sense, however, are now prevailing. The Community can and must resume its forward movement on the great issues of democratic governance.

On the other side of the divide dictatorial rule still persists, thwarting legitimate popular desires and stifling most human rights. Since World War II the Red Army has seen action in Europe only on the territory of its allies. Nonetheless, even if haltingly, some progress has been made toward a less regimented life for the citizens of Eastern Europe and toward greater external autonomy. Partly as a result of the Helsinki process, some East European nations have increased their economic, political, cultural, religious, and human contacts with the West, meeting the deepest wishes of people on both sides of the divide. This progression seems likely to continue and should be actively supported by all Western governments.

A new chapter opened for the German Question in 1972, with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and its Eastern neighbors. Signature of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 extended this trend and provided a long-term framework for improving relations between Eastern and Western Europe. The German Question has not received its final answer, nor has the wider problem of barriers between East and West in Europe. These answers will not come soon or simply. They can develop only within the wider European political framework — hence the importance of the European Community, and only as substantial agreements ease security concerns — hence the importance of Helsinki.

East European governments and peoples are important actors in this evolutionary process, but the West must understand that the process can move forward only with the involvement of the Soviet Union. For its part, the USSR must understand that the West will defend its security interests but has no intention of threatening theirs. Our desire is not to destabilize the East, but to see Eastern Europe advance and evolve in a way which enhances the security of all.

Two processes must therefore continue to operate in Europe: the Helsinki process, with continued active participation from the US and Canada, and the further integration and strengthening of West European institutions. It is within the framework established by these processes that the aspirations of the German people and of all the people of Europe, East and West, have the best hope of realization.

C. *The Third World: From Confrontation to Development.* It is in the interest of the West, as it is of the developing nations, that the countries of the South be enabled to pursue with success their quest for independence, economic viability, political stability, and environmental awareness. The West should encourage with understanding, and assist with political and economic means, the desire of these countries to attain conditions of human dignity. It is important that aspirations for self-determination be viewed in their specific settings without the injection of East-West rivalry. The West's long-term goal should be voluntary interdependence, reflecting the desires of developing countries to contribute toward a peaceful and secure world.

That said, it will be hard to avoid a continuing element of East-West rivalry in Third World problems, because of the Soviet push to expand its influence and its support of "national liberation movements." How then can each regional dispute be prevented from becoming an East-West issue? Mechanisms, or at least approaches, are urgently needed to avoid or mitigate confrontations, even where solutions cannot be found.

We support genuine non-alignment as a way for Third World countries to avoid becoming cockpits of East-West conflict. The West should encourage Third World countries to assume greater responsibility for settling Third World disputes without outside interference. Regional groupings like the Organization of African Unity must develop real strengths and sound procedures for managing regional problems. The US should assist in breathing new life into the Organization of American States. Where a regional consensus has evolved into a viable regional or sub-regional organization, the West should be prepared to back it up with diplomatic and economic resources. ASEAN, the Commonwealth, the Andean Group and the Gulf Group are examples worthy of support. In Central America the process set in motion by the Contadora Group should be actively encouraged.

The special role of West European governments and Japan with regard to the developing world should be enhanced. Canada and the Nordic countries have demonstrated important capabilities, and other West Europeans also have close diplomatic and economic ties with many Third World areas. Because they are not superpowers, their role in activities such as peacekeeping has been found acceptable where neither the US nor the USSR would be welcome. The United Nations should also be assisted to be more active in regional disputes and the Secretary General supported in his desire to do more on his own, as well as to give more assistance to regional organizations. Soviet support for these efforts is important. Suspicions of a superpower condominium and other crippling problems are less likely to arise if East and West deal with each other in and through the UN as well as directly.

Should issues outside of Europe be taken up directly between East and West? We believe there will be times when it is advantageous to do so. The USSR is often involved politically, economically, and militarily in Third-World disputes. Soviet goals are rarely consonant with those of the West, but seeking to

freeze out the Soviet Union can also aggravate regional issues. At present, for example, we believe that situations such as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Iran-Iraq war should be the subjects of East-West discussions. The aim should be to see if a pattern of restraint and cooperation can be evolved.

Outside powers, especially the USSR, often search for ways to turn a regional dispute to their advantage, even at the cost of worsening the dispute. Transfers of conventional arms to Third World nations reflect this outlook. It should be replaced by a serious search for ways to cooperate in resolving disputes and minimizing outside involvement. Such an environment would make it possible to address the arms trade effectively.

Third World governments can play a larger role in resolving their political disputes only if their economies are advancing on a sound basis. Debt has become a major problem. Western assistance in dealing with it is an essential contribution to reviving development and reducing political turmoil. It is in the Western interest to take major steps in this direction even though the only real solution will come through economic growth.

Development issues, however, cannot be equated with debt problems. Certain countries are not rich enough to accumulate significant debts, yet they are often the hardest hit by current economic problems. East and West have a responsibility to cooperate in implementing a development strategy based on sustained economic growth. Official development aid is a component of that responsibility, whether bilateral or funneled through UN and World Bank channels. Adequate replenishment of the International Development Association is a critical problem today and should be addressed in a positive way. The Soviet Union, which uses fallacious historical arguments to shirk its responsibilities and makes no significant contribution to Third World aid, should reconsider its stand.

D. *The Industrial Democracies: Toward Consensus.* A coherent political process within the West is a prerequisite to coherent policies toward the East. This process has been deficient. Beyond exhortation what can be done? The answer lies partly in our institutions and partly in our geography. The most important and difficult challenge lies in the consideration we accord, or fail to accord, to each other's views. Interests do diverge, across the Atlantic or Pacific and among West Europeans

as well. These divergences must be dealt with, not ignored or smothered.

We believe that the most promising approach to the need for continuity on East-West matters is to build on the institutions the West already has. The Summit Seven has evolved from an economic mandate into other areas. This development should be encouraged, and Summits should attempt to improve their follow-through by more systematic involvement of other Western institutions. A Summit could, for example, charge an *ad hoc* group of senior officials with rethinking a particular East-West issue. If the Summit Seven is to develop on these lines, more working sessions will be required.

The Summit Seven should not, however, develop into a Directorate with its own bureaucracy. In time no doubt new institutions will evolve; for the coming decade existing institutions involving small as well as large nations, neutrals as well as allies, must be better used to ensure harmony within the West.

Within the Atlantic Alliance there is an important need for a stronger European role. It can be developed utilizing the Community and the Western European Union whose reinvigoration is a welcome step. In OECD the traditional economic agenda is well-handled, but there is a need to deal with difficult policy questions. Again, the Europeans should expand their role, coordinating views in the Community structure if this works best.

The most significant contribution that European governments could make to Western harmony would be greater European harmony. No individual European state can have nearly the impact on Western policies that a concert of European opinion would have. Political processes which can produce such cohesion thus deserve a high priority. They will be more effective if they lead to concerted action as well as common attitudes. Joint enterprises in high technology and defense industries, agreed positions and programs on defense and on arms control, combined initiatives on East-West trade and investment — all that strengthens the European pillar can reinforce the transatlantic link and strengthen the West as a whole, provided it is done within the larger framework. We believe this will be true even when policy approaches diverge on either side of the Atlantic, as they will from time to time. Current discussions in the Western European Union have underlined this point.

Intra-Western consultations and the entire consultative process must be infused with a new spirit. There is a deplorable gap between promise and performance. The US receives the sharpest criticism, and that is understandable in view of its weight within the West; but the US is far from being the only government to act first and consult later. Governments intend well and their promises to consult are not insincere, but often are ineffective. Domestic political factors are allowed to override the views — even the unanimous views — of friends and allies.

We recognize the importance of internal political processes, but we urge that except in emergencies the following guideline be observed: an individual government will not take action that seriously affects its allies without consulting them, and it will do its best to be responsive when there are major objections. Refraining from unilateral action when there is opposition from one's closest friends is likely to be less costly in the long run than the divisions caused when one of us goes it alone.

III. **The Security Relationship**

A. *Basic Principles*. The undersigned have been involved in international relations for most of the atomic age. Our experiences have taught us that neither East nor West can be secure when the other is insecure, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons. There can be mutual security or mutual insecurity, but it will be mutual in either case. What can be done?

The first, inescapable requirement is to face squarely the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons. The greatest natural disaster that has ever befallen mankind would pale beside the holocaust a few dozen of these weapons could produce. And the arsenals of East and West contain warheads in the tens of thousands. In view of this, and the diversity in the means of delivery, prospects for successful nationwide or alliance-wide defense against nuclear weapons are virtually nonexistent.

This has led to a cautious stalemate: each side's weapons ensure that the other's are not used. Each deters the other. Such deterrence, in our judgment, is neither immoral nor illogical. There have now been almost four decades of nuclear peace, in spite of serious East-West crises. But deterrence may not be eternal, and behind it there always yawns the atomic abyss. Any policy which cannot withstand a single major failure, whether of a machine or of a fallible human being, is understandably ques-

tioned by thoughtful people the world over. Hence the search for positive alternatives to deterrence should continue, hand in hand with attempts to strengthen and stabilize deterrence.

Statemanship can and must guide us all through this dangerous passage. Political leaders of East and West have recognized that the power to destroy involves the responsibility to conserve. It is vital that East and West alike resist the siren song of "superiority." Neither side will permit the other to achieve a meaningful superiority and attempts to gain an advantage are dangerous as well as illusory. Such attempts tend to undermine security for all, as they worsen relations between East and West. A stable balance should be the goal. It alone cannot guarantee peace, nor does it fire the imagination, but it can be made to work. It is the responsibility of leaders on both sides to conserve this balance at the lowest level. Arms control efforts and the separate policies of East and West have vital roles to play in meeting this challenge.

B. *Reducing Risks: No Early Use.* The unimaginable horror of thermonuclear war should not blind us to the imaginable horrors of conventional war. A sound security policy for the West must reduce the risks of both. This is so not only because a conventional war with modern weaponry could be even more destructive than World War II, but because such a war would be the most likely prelude to nuclear war. This is particularly true in Europe, where the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact face each other directly and where even a skirmish would raise the specter of nuclear war.

We believe it is essential to reduce Western reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe. We therefore recommend that the Atlantic Alliance move toward no early use of such weapons. A consensus appears to be forming in support of this important objective. There is less agreement as yet on how the objective is to be attained and time is needed to sort out various approaches.

One means of reducing nuclear risks deserves priority attention: the further withdrawal of NATO short-range, battlefield nuclear weapons from the dividing line in Central Europe. Their present disposition far forward could bring heavy pressure on political leaders to allow their use during the earliest stages of any NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict lest they be overrun before a decision could be reached. The "use them or lose them" dilemma would operate rapidly during the inevitable fog of battle, and using them could initiate the march up the escalatory ladder.

The possibility of premature or unnecessary use of nuclear weapons should be unacceptable to Alliance leaders and steps should be taken to eliminate it. NATO has on two occasions decided to remove a number of these weapons: 1,000 in 1979 and 1,400 more in 1983. We recommend that NATO implement its 1983 decision rapidly, and proceed to further withdrawals of obsolescent weapons.*

C. *Maintaining Security*. As reliance on short-range nuclear weapons declines, Western security must be adequately protected and public opinion reassured. Troop levels should be examined. It is possible that higher levels might be necessary, but we believe that NATO's current troop strength can maintain Alliance security, provided that more effective use is made of the troops already on hand. Forward defense must be, and we believe can be, ensured via an improved conventional force posture. The prudent application of new defense technologies will be an important factor, but technology should not be expected to provide a panacea, in Europe or elsewhere. Modest increases in defense spending have already been agreed upon, and the NATO target of 3% should be met. It is not realistic, however, to imagine that it will be raised, nor should that be necessary. The Alliance should aim at:

- Improving relative conventional capabilities through better use of available funds and manpower;
- Organizing and utilizing reserves more effectively;
- Developing new defense technology (so-called force multipliers) and assuring a major European role in producing them;
- Gaining better early warning mechanisms, both through new technology and through confidence building measures negotiated in the Vienna and the Stockholm talks;
- Increasing the relative weight of Europe in assuring its security;
- Consolidating and enhancing the role played by France.

Arms control can also make an important contribution by making both sides more secure while decreasing their defense burdens. A central Western goal should be to use such negotiations to further a policy of no early use. This would stabilize and im-

* M. Jean-Pierre Cot feels that no early use is in contradiction with the concept of deterrence.

prove East-West relations, as well as reduce the heavy costs which the race in Europe represents for both sides.

D. *Curbing the Arms Race*. There are deep-seated political and ideological problems between East and West, and curbing the arms race will not automatically solve them. The continuance of the nuclear arms race, however, and its expansion into previously unexploited technological areas, will tend increasingly to poison political relations, making resolution of problems ever more difficult and ultimately imperiling peace itself. We have put the political relationship in first place, but East and West must also move forward simultaneously and on a broad front with arms control. This will continue to be a central index of progress and a principal channel for dialogue betweeen East and West.

Regarding strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, we share the widespread concern over the current state of arms control endeavors. It can only be a source of deep dissatisfaction to leaders and people, both East and West, that for more than ten years no nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union has been signed and ratified. This not only harms East-West relations, it increasingly sets the West against itself, damaging its political cohesion.

We believe the goals of the West, with respect to nuclear arms control, should be to maintain an adequate deterrent posture while:

- Improving strategic stability;
- Regulating the modernization process;
- Reducing the numbers of weapons in stages;
- Lessening tensions.

These goals should be reflected both in Western defense programs and in negotiations with adversaries. Western programs should proceed cautiously, so that new systems and advancing technology do not close off negotiated solutions. This could be the case, for example, with the cruise missile impairing verifiability. Efforts to reduce missile vulnerability and thus enhance stability should be pursued. On major strategic issues the West should develop consistent, balanced positions that will command wide public support. As a contribution to this process, Western governments should formulate a comprehensive agenda for approval by the North Atlantic Council. Not every detail of

everyone's defense program or negotiating position can be or need be agreed by all the Allies, but basic differences must be reconciled if serious damage is to be avoided.

Caution is called for with regard to strategic defense. The parties to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems retain the right to conduct research on ballistic missile defense. We urge, however, that the objectives of US and Soviet research be kept limited while the larger strategic problems are given careful examination within the [illegible]S, among the Allies (on the model of the NATO study on ABMs in 1968), and between the US and the USSR in accordance with the provisions of Agreed Statement D to the Treaty. Decisions or actions which would run counter to the ABM Treaty should be eschewed. This Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability. It should be built on and improved where necessary, but not undercut.

The troubled arms control process demands a high priority. As first steps, we recommend:

- Talks should begin promptly between the US and USSR on controlling anti-satellite weapons. Observation, communication, and other satellites have made a vital contribution to strategic stability, which must not be squandered in destabilizing efforts to gain unilateral, transient advantages.
- US-Soviet negotiations on reducing nuclear arms should recommence. It is important to ensure that ceilings agreed for strategic weapons are not undermined by shorter-range systems. All of their systems capable of striking the territory of European states should therefore be addressed. A basic objective should be sharp reductions in warhead levels, perhaps through annual percentage cuts, and the gradual de[illegible]irving of both forces.
- Confidence-building measures from the Atlantic to the Urals are being stressed in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). If they have real content such measures can help reduce the risk of nuclear war. They should be combined with a more general renunciation of force, which is already being discussed at Stockholm. The CDE should move promptly toward its second phase and explorations of its possible content should begin shortly. Substantial Soviet withdrawals should be a central Western objective.

- Previously-negotiated US-Soviet agreements on nuclear testing should be brought into force and the trilateral US/UK/USSR talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban should be resumed. The groundwork for a sound, verifiable ban has already been laid. Other nuclear-weapon states should be invited to join these talks, but their absence should not hold up negotiations.

There are two important negotiations, stalled for more than a decade, which do not focus on nuclear weapons. They can, however, contribute to central objectives if they are given high-level attention and impetus.

- An initial agreement on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions should be given visible priority, perhaps through a Foreign Ministers' meeting. Limiting force levels and introducing related confidence-building and verification measures can reduce the risk of surprise attack. The Vienna talks should then move beyond token reductions and attempt to gain the benefits which serious cuts could bring.
- A verifiable agreement to prohibit possession of chemical weapons would help to control their proliferation. It would also relieve fears of a chemical attack in Europe against which NATO might not have an adequate non-nuclear response. Improvements should be negotiated in the verification and compliance arrangements relating to this entire field.

If East and West move on these lines to restart arms control, they will be better placed to carry forward the vital task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We strongly endorse the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has served the world well since its signature sixteen years ago. It will soon be coming up for review and deserves to be strengthened. Further development of the inspection arrangements carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency is most desirable. Avoiding proliferation clearly is an interest shared with the East, and with leading neutrals and non-aligned nations as well.

The major arms suppliers, East and West, should join in a determined, high-level effort to limit transfers of conventional arms. Effective limitations cannot be developed and sustained without the help of important Third World governments, but it is not realistic to expect recipients to take the initiative. The current absence of this important issue from the international agenda is a standing reproach to all nations. 17

E. *Opening a New Channel.* In addition to activating these negotiating forums and providing Western negotiators with sound, mutually advantageous proposals, we recommend that the West, in the first instance the United States, propose the creation of a new body: a Strategic Panel. This body would initially be composed of a small number of high-level US and Soviet representatives. It would be official, its deliberations confidential, and its working methods informal. But it would not be a negotiating forum, nor would it be a substitute for the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, though in certain respects it could be patterned after that valuable body. Rather, the Strategic Panel would be charged with establishing a security dialogue, weaving together the many strands of arms control negotiations and defense policy decisions involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As early tasks the Panel could, for example, explore ways of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe, controlling technological innovation, improving verification and treaty compliance, and enhancing stability.

We further recommend that the West propose a network of Crisis Control Centers, linking the capitals of the nuclear-weapon states and perhaps other key locations as well. These centers, basically technical communications facilities, would provide instant contact — audio, visual, and documentary — in any situation involving the actual or possible use of a nuclear weapon. Such a proposal would be in conformity with the bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the US, Britain and France on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.

In sum, we believe the East-West arms control agenda is long, and time is short. There cannot be winners and losers in this search for viable arms control agreements, for no nation will sign or honor an agreement it believes to be harmful to its vital interests. Arms control is a mutual endeavor whose goal is enhanced mutual security. It is time to move forward.

IV. **Trading Across the Chasm**

A. *Problems and Possibilities.* The importance of economic factors in relations among nations hardly needs to be argued. Trade, even between adversaries, must be advantageous to both sides; otherwise it would not be sustained. Moreover, it can serve as a bridge across the chasm dividing East and West.

Between East and West, the character of the security relationship imposes immediate constraints on trade: neither side will sell the other goods of direct military utility. This restriction will have to be maintained for many years to come. The issue for the West, then, is where to draw the line and how to police it, not whether there should be such a restriction. Within the West, the subject has been painfully divisive. It stands high on any list of problems for which Western leaders will need to develop better approaches. The problem itself is becoming more intractable. Rather than a line, there is a growing zone or grey area of items which have some present or potential military relevance, yet are widely available for many purposes and from many sources. Another broad review of the problem is clearly in order.

The same can be said about political constraints. Like any other part of the East-West relationship, trade inevitably has its political aspects. Circumstances have arisen, and may well arise again, in which Soviet actions compel a number of Western governments to consider responses that include trade restrictions. The advocates of such sanctions often exaggerate their potential effect. There are times of course when "something" must be done, when words, though important, are not enough. Moreover, the USSR certainly does not welcome Western sanctions and their prospect may therefore have some deterrent effect. Yet, given the modest level and character of Eastern trade with the West, nobody should imagine that such measures could move the Soviet Union to take steps which might impinge on its core interests. When Western governments must act, they will do themselves less damage if they bear in mind the important difference between trade under established agreements and trade which is only in prospect. Timely and meaningful consultations with allies are, moreover, essential.

These are, in brief, the negative elements in the economic relationship. The West badly needs to handle them more carefully and effectively. Even more important, the West should find ways to develop the positive side. This must be done with open eyes. Trade cannot by itself dissolve the profound differences and conflicts between East and West. It is not a panacea. Yet trade is a shared interest, like preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear war, and it is important to expand the positive elements in East-West relations in whatever ways are possible. Healthy, growing East-West trade will not eliminate problems in

arms control or human rights, but it will in general have a favorable effect on the overall relationship.

B. *Normalizing Trade*. The key concept for the next stage of East-West trade should be normalization. Western governments should generally encourage trade with the East as they encourage trade with other areas. Dreams that withholding trade could intensify Eastern difficulties and bring about basic changes in their system are not realistic. Conversely, the East should not be subsidized with the special terms and preferences appropriate to developing countries.

The exclusion of these extremes does not mean that East-West trade will merely be a neutral, purely economic factor. Even at the relatively low levels which can be foreseen for the near term, trade with the West can have important positive effects within the East, encouraging the modernization of thought processes as well as technical processes. Its role can, however, only be secondary. The driving forces for change must come and will come from within these societies, as they do in the West.

A number of obstacles will have to be surmounted even for the next phase of normalization. There are problems in meshing the trading practices of market economies and centrally planned economies. The centrally planned economies have built-in non-tariff barriers; they are not really open to imports in the way that market economies are (or try to be). Moreover, the planned economies have a worrisome potential for dumping their exports if they choose. One undesirable result of a rising level of East-West trade could be stronger calls for protection. There are also fears on both sides regarding security of supply and possible political manipulation. There is a need for better management of the credits extended to the East. The question of counter-trade offers growing opportunities and growing problems, in East-West as in North-South relations.

These matters have been under serious study in NATO and OECD since the Yamal gas pipeline issue. It seems clear that if a basic decision is made to encourage normal trade, then the procedures and institutions for managing Western problems can be developed, though not without serious effort. A significant instrument can be Long-Term Agreements which combine governmental and private mechanisms in a flexible manner. The agreement governing US-Soviet trade in grain could serve as one

model. It was developed for US circumstances, which are politically the most difficult, and it has stood up rather well.

It may be observed that the US has not readily accepted its own handling of grain as a model for other East-West arrangements, including other sectors of US-Soviet trade. In the long run, however, a double standard should not and cannot be maintained. In fact a similar structure of agreements is already emerging to handle the West European purchases of Soviet gas, and comparable arrangements will have to develop if the potential for Soviet trade in the Far East, especially with Japan, is to be realized. That particular channel, important for the development of Siberia, would be greatly assisted if the Soviet Union would seek a basic improvement in relations with Japan.

The current phase, which concentrates on the sale to the USSR of grain and the purchase of energy, provides an opportunity to perfect Long-Term Agreements and other mechanisms while studying larger possibilities. The Soviet Union has serious problems to solve if it is to broaden its exports. Several East European countries may lead the way, for their manufactures are now sometimes competitive in price and quality. The West should encourage such developments, aided by the greater flexibility toward novel relationships found, for example, in Hungary.

A truly normal East-West economic relationship can come only as the East modernizes its industry and engages as a more equal partner in the sort of exchanges which are characteristic among developed countries. Such industrial modernization will require new technology, and the West should be willing to cooperate within appropriate bounds. Important changes will be required, however. In the West, security considerations must be respected, but distinctions among technologies can be made and reasonable controls will then be more widely accepted and more effective.

On the Eastern side the relationship between advanced technology and military strength must be frankly acknowledged. The Soviet obsession with secrecy may be explained historically, but such secretiveness is a serious obstacle to East-West economic relations. With greater openness on the Eastern side, Western fears about abuse of technology transfers can be bettter dealt with and major expansions will become thinkable.

C. *Full Normalization*. It will take decades for a situation that could be called "normal" to evolve in East-West trade. Yet something potentially far-reaching is already taking place in special situations, between the two German states and between Austria and Hungary. There are sound political considerations in these situations, but there are also sound reasons to reflect on what might lie ahead in the larger East-West context. A succession of commissions and study groups, European and American, national and international, have pointed to what one called "the intimate engagement of trade" as fostering desirable economic and political developments. In opening the doors and the minds of high Soviet and East European officials, the visits of Western business leaders prepared to discuss large and mutually advantageous arrangements can be singularly effective. (They can open some Western minds as well.) The working relations which arms control, at its best, can generate in the security field should develop more readily through trade, an area less plagued by the secrecy which surrounds military matters in the USSR.

To describe the components and characteristics of a fully developed economic relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be the subject of serious work within Western governments, international institutions, and scholarly circles. The OECD in particular should build on the role it has already assumed. It should begin to work on the more difficult political issues for eventual decisions by Western political leaders. Work should also go forward between East and West, by expanding the rather limited contacts between Western specialists and their Eastern counterparts, as well as through official channels such as the Economic Commission for Europe.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund can also be helpful in defining possibilities and criteria for viable projects. Western governments should encourage membership in the Bank and Fund for the East European governments not yet participating. When and if the USSR is ready to consider membership, that also should be looked at with an open mind, though it poses much more difficult problems. These memberships would be significant advances toward an integrated world economy. In such a world the principles of comparative advantage and the international division of labor would at last operate freely, to the benefit of East and West and of the developing world as well.

Before long it could be helpful for a group of Wise Men to

take up the basic problems of East-West trade. This should be done when their recommendations have a reasonable chance of falling on politically fertile ground. A good indication of receptivity would be the willingness of leading Western governments to support such an effort and to encourage non-partisan participation at the highest level, for example by former heads of government, cabinet officers, and major business leaders. In this as in other large endeavors, a fruitful interaction between governments and private circles can accomplish much more than strictly governmental efforts, decisive as those necessarily are in the end.

V. Competition and Cooperation

A. *First Steps*. We have said that improving the security relationship is not enough and we have advocated that economic relations be widened. But over the long run the people of East and West must also develop their relations in areas such as science, the humanities, travel, and education — contacts which bring mutual benefits, advance the common good, and dilute the continuing adversarial elements in the relationship. Self-interest also points in this direction. The West is rightly proud that it has been steadily improving the well-being of its people, but it also faces problems — unemployment and the deterioration of infrastructure, for example.

The first stage of this effort should aim to dispel the ignorance and misunderstandings that each side has of the other. This task by its nature involves more than governments, but it cannot go forward against their will. The immediate objective should therefore be Eastern leaders, both high officials, civilian and military, and opinion molders. A systematic effort to foster contacts with these groups should be a prime goal of Western leaders, and considerations of protocol or reciprocity should not be given undue weight.

An equally important but broader and longer-range objective should be educating young people on both sides. Visits of young political leaders can be especially fruitful and opportunities for scholarly travel in both directions should be expanded. Despite inevitable imbalances in funding and other aspects, Fulbright-type fellowships in the West for Soviet and East European students would be worth many times their cost over the long run. Increased support should also be provided for Western scholar-

ship on the USSR and Eastern Europe. The decline in such studies should be reversed and their attractiveness to outstanding students sharply enhanced. Attention should also be given to what young people on each side are taught about the other. Scholarly committees could usefully examine such materials.

B. *Modern Communications*. Radio and television are especially powerful instruments for shaping the images and attitudes which one people holds about another. It is not realistic to expect that the governments on either side will cease to criticize the other side or restructure their roles: Eastern control over what these instruments convey internally and abroad; and Western openness, complemented by limited governmental efforts to communicate across the barriers. These official Western efforts should be increased. The competition of ideas is healthy and inevitable and it should go forward in the electronic marketplace.

At the same time, greater efforts should be made to develop cooperative relations and program exchanges, starting from less politicized areas such as music, art, and drama. As the West increases both its broadcasts and its efforts to cooperate with the East in making full use of revolutionary advances in communications technology, it will be important that the content of Western material not descend into propaganda.

C. *Meeting New Challenges*. Exchanges and cooperation in science and culture can bring important advantages, even though they may not be immediate or tangible. The people of the Soviet Union and its allies have proud histories, marked by great contributions in science, literature, music, and other fields. Despite the tragic depredations of the Stalin period, Soviet scientists do world-class work in a number of fields, such as theoretical and high-energy physics, metallurgy, and mathematics. In space medicine, for example, the US could gain from cooperative exchanges.

A higher level of exchanges and more openness will obviously be difficult to achieve. The West should not lower its sights, however, and its eventual goals should include charging the best minds of East and West with developing joint projects aimed at solving the great problems of the next century. Some of these are problems that East and West share as developed societies, for example the environmental impact of modern industrial activity. Simply ascertaining the consequences for human health of the

thousands of new chemical products developed every year is more of an enterprise than any one nation can manage.

The technological revolution, for which satellites, computers and microchips have become the symbols, is making possible networks of a character hardly imaginable in the past. Such worldwide networks could facilitate major cooperative projects enlisting the best brains on both sides, to the benefit of the West as well as the East. Projects of this nature can interlock the interests of East and West, making clear even to those with an inclination toward Stalinist autarky that building walls between us can only impede progress.

D. *The Next Century: Wealth and Poverty*. Turning to the developing nations, the challenges are even more staggering. Both East and West are entering an age of relative affluence. But both will soon have to live in a world of more than six billion people, most of them facing bitter poverty. It is both a moral duty and a practical necessity for the developed nations — East and West — to begin to cooperate on these global questions. Political turmoil and natural disasters in poorer lands are creating ever larger numbers of refugees, for example. The West cannot seal itself off from the consequences of such events and the East, in time, will also feel their impact.

East-West cooperation on global problems should at times be bilateral, but the more normal mode should be through multilateral institutions, the UN and its major specialized agencies as well as the new institutions which come into existence to meet new needs. Both existing and new institutions must be managed with great care to minimize the twin evils of polarization and politicization, whether along East-West, North-South, or any other dividing lines. The effective working of these structures is too important to permit them to remain or become ideological battlegrounds. These differences, however profound, will only be resolved through political processes and eventual reconciliation.

E. *Unfinished Business*. Any project as broad as this will encounter questions which it can take up only in passing, if at all. Some are not ripe for treatment. Others require minute examination or heavy investments of time and resources. A lengthy list of such topics could be compiled. We have felt it useful, however,

to list some questions which are clearly of first importance and which the West ought to address in a non-partisan manner, whether by governments, by private groups such as ours, or by some combination of both.

General: What major, long-term initiatives in economic, cultural, or scientific relations and communications might have the potential of transforming the relationship, sector by sector, over the decades to come?

West-West Relations: In view of divergent interests within the West, what further improvements in policies and institutions could enable us to manage relations with the East in a more coherent and constructive fashion?

Europe: Assuming further advances in the Helsinki process, how can the West encourage a broader Soviet outlook and more substantial reductions in the barriers between Eastern and Western Europe?

East Asia: Can a political process comparable to Helsinki be developed in this economically thriving and politically important region?

Developing World: Arms purchases and the expansion of military industries often supplant and endanger economic growth. Can the international community take steps to bring this trend under control?

Security Relations: What should be done about long-term conventional defenses if NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons is reduced? Can arms control measures help to limit risks and offer relief from economic costs?

Nuclear Arms Control: Assuming that negotiations resume, what goals should be set for significant, attainable reductions? Can criteria be agreed for sustaining stability?

Verification and Compliance: Can the two alliances or the broader international community develop more reliable and less embittering procedures for ensuring compliance with arms control arrangements?

Communications: What are the implications of technological change for the management of East-West relations? Can the West speak out candidly and still improve relations with governments whose actions stir its indignation?

The Emerging Generation: What can be done to encourage young people to rise above narrow nationalism as the Atlanticists pass from the scene?

Afterword

Some may find our conclusions timid and colored by the very pessimism we deplore. Others may judge our prescriptions unrealistic. To the former we say it is quite useless to put forward proposals so far-reaching that they cannot gain acceptance. Good will is not enough. Utopia is a goal, not a policy. To the latter we say that their "realism" ignores reality. It belittles the nuclear danger. It discounts or despairs of Third World problems. It demonizes our adversaries.

The fundamental reality is that the leaders of East and West have in their hands the means to annihilate not only each other's society, but much of the rest of the world as well. The dangers we all face are beyond mankind's experience; the past provides no precedent and nuclear war would foreclose the future. Thus, in a real sense, Eastern and Western leaders are custodians of the world's future. They bear a joint responsibility for reducing the risks of their inevitable competition and maintaining nuclear peace. We believe this is the reality against which they will be and should be judged.

The policies recommended by the Aspen Institute International Group — sustained engagement based on strength and flexibility — embody basic principles, shared values, and judgments drawn from our years of government service and public activity:

- We must live in the world as it is while we work for the world we would like to see. Competition and a balance of power between East and West are basic facts of life, yet they need not be so dangerous or so costly.
- In a world of sovereign states, our primary focus must be on their external behavior. Our human concerns extend across frontiers, but their practical realization presents difficult choices.
- Containing and influencing Soviet power requires that the West be strong, cohesive, and consistent in upholding its interests and values. It does not require confrontation.
- East-West relations will remain a shifting mix of competition and cooperation. Wise leadership consists in prudently managing the former while tirelessly encouraging the latter.
- Preventing war between East and West is the first duty of statesmen on both sides.

These principles offer a comprehensive framework for common Western policies toward the East. An engaged approach is neither indifferent to moral issues nor is it a crusade. It reflects neither unreal optimism nor bleak pessimism. We must be guided by an historical perspective and we must be prepared to pursue our objectives over a lengthy span. Our strategy of sustained engagement should be tested against events but not altered by every circumstance. It must be animated by a profound conviction that human beings can do what has to be done, and by a spirit of cooperation in approaching these difficult problems. We, the signers of this Statement, are confident that the judgment of history will confirm that this is not only our best course, it is our only choice.

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MAR 8 1985

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